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At approximately $6.9 billion, The Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) 
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oversight required are not as well defined.  Realizing this, both DoD and the U.S. 
Congress are scrambling to create laws and policies to bridge this gap.  The 
commercial section has considerable experience in this area, as acquisition of 
services is a growing endeavor there too.  This thesis examines current and 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND DISCUSSION 
...Congress’ perception was that we were somehow pulling a fast 
one.  We were getting ready to issue the largest contract in the 
Department of Defense’s (DoD) history, and we hadn’t asked for 
Congress’ permission, we weren’t treating it like a traditional 
acquisition program, and we hadn’t asked for any new money to do 
this. (Emery, Feb 2002). 
This quote by Ron Turner, then Deputy Chief Information Officer for 
Plans, Policy, Performance, Infrastructure, Systems and Technology for the Navy, 
summarizes the concerns that the U.S. Congress had with the Navy-Marine Corps 
Intranet (NMCI) contract.  At approximately $6.9 billion (Hoffmann, July 2002), 
this was easily the largest service contract that DoD had ever awarded.  The U.S. 
Navy viewed it as a Performance Based Services Contract (PBSC) and not a new 
acquisition program.  Congress took a different view.  In the 2002 Defense 
Authorization Act, Congress, along with providing $582 million for NMCI, 
attached milestones, conditions and a requirement for rigorous testing.  This has 
had the effect of delaying the implementation of NMCI (Capaccio, July 2002).  
Yet, for all of the fan-fare that the U.S. Navy is getting over NMCI, it is not the 
first or only contract to raise the issue of oversight of PBSCs and Performance 
Based Services Acquisitions (PBSAs). 
Acquisition of services has become an increasingly significant 
component of procurements in the Department of Defense.  From 
1992 through 1999, DoD procurement of services increased from 
$39.9 billion to $51.8 billion.  In 1999, total dollars spent on 
services equaled the amount spent on supplies [and] systems...this 
trend is expected to continue....  (Gansler, Jan 2001). 
The trend is clear.  Acquisition of services is already a major activity and 
is an expanding one for the future.  The rapidly growing dollar amounts suggest 
that the mechanics and techniques of PBSA are well defined.  However, the U.S. 
Navy’s experience with NMCI suggests that the amount and type of oversight 
required on such acquisitions is decidedly less well defined.  Realizing this, both 
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DoD and the U.S. Congress are scrambling to create laws and policies to bridge 
this gap. 
In the FY 2002 National Defense Authorization Act, the U.S. Congress 
directed DoD to “establish and implement a management structure for the 
procurement of services for the Department of Defense...achieve savings in 
expenditures for procurements of services through the use of performance-based 
services contracting...[and] promulgate in the Department of Defense Supplement 
to the Federal Acquisition Regulation regulations [regarding] the purchase of 
services by the Department of Defense...”  (Public Law 107-107, Dec 2001).  In 
March of 2002, U.S. Congressman Tom Davis of Virginia introduced HR-3832, 
the Services Acquisition Reform Act (SARA).  In addition, the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics directed each of the 
Military Components to draft and submit by August 2002 a Services Contracts 
Oversight Process (SCOP) (Aldridge, May 2002). 
B. AREA AND PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
This thesis examines current and proposed policy and procedures for the 
oversight of the acquisition of large-scale services by the DoD.  It is intended to 
benefit DoD acquisition offices and activities with regards to the drafting and 
implementation of policy governing supervision of large service contracts.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
1. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
Are the current and proposed policies and procedures associated with the 
supervision of acquisition of services, such as the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet, 
effective and consistent with best practices? 
2. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
a. How does the DoD currently manage the acquisition of large-scale 
systems and services? 
b. What policies and procedures are being proposed for DoD’s 
management of large-scale services? 
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c. What are the best practices, both commercial and federal, for the 
acquisition of large-scale services? 
D. SCOPE AND RESEARCH METHOD 
The scope of this thesis includes:  (1) a review of the regulation regarding 
traditional product acquisition, Performance Based Services Acquisition and a 
history of NMCI; (2) an examination of current regulation and policy oversight of 
services acquisition and proposed regulation from the U.S. Congress; (3) the 
presentation of issues and concerns associated with the supervision of large scale 
services contracts; and (4) analysis of the impact of current regulation upon 
NMCI. 
The methodology employed in researching this thesis was a literature 
search; a thorough search of applicable books, reports, journal and newspaper 
articles, policies, regulations, and other information sources.  Determinations are 
made based upon research analysis.  
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis consists of five chapters.  Chapter I is an introduction to the 
thesis.  It provides an initial background to the thesis topic along with the purpose, 
and scope of the research.  Chapter I also reveals the research questions involved 
and highlights the over all thesis organization. 
Chapter II discusses how traditional product acquisition is conducted and 
the scale and nature of service acquisitions.  Besides a general discussion of 
performance based service contracts, the history and recent status of the Navy-
Marine Corps Intranet contract will be reviewed.   
Chapter III is a collection of existing and proposed policy and legislation 
governing the acquisition of services.  Offices and sources involved include the 
Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the 
Department of the Navy, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. House 
of Representatives, and the U.S. Senate.  As a basis of comparison, the best 
practices from the commercial sector and from 0other Federal agencies for the 
acquisition of services are examined in this chapter. 
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Chapter IV is the analysis of existing and proposed oversight approaches 
for large-scale services as they apply to an acquisition such as NMCI.   
Chapter V summarizes the answers to the primary and secondary research 
questions and provides the author’s recommendations, conclusions, and areas 




A. TRADITIONAL WEAPON ACQUISITION 
The Defense Acquisition System exists to secure and sustain the 
nation’s investments in technologies, programs, and product 
support necessary to achieve the National Security Strategy and 
support the United States Armed Forces. (DOD Directive 5000.1, 
2002). 
1. Divisions of Defense Acquisition Programs 
Defense acquisition generally applies to the obtaining of weapons and/or 
information technology products.  Acquisition programs are divided into several 
categories, depending on their dollar value and who the milestone decision 
authority is.  A Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) is defined as "an 
acquisition program...designated by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics) (USD(AT&L)) as an MDAP, or estimated by the 
USD(AT&L) to require an eventual total expenditure for research, development, 
test and evaluation of more than $365 million in fiscal year (FY) 2000 constant 
dollars or, for procurement, of more than $2.190 billion in FY 2000 constant 
dollars."  (DOD Instruction 5000.2, 2002).    
Acquisition programs are further divided into various acquisition 
categories or ACATs.  All MDAPs are ACAT I and vary only by the delegation 
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2. Management of a Major Defense Acquisition Program 
 
Figure 1. Major Acquisition Model  
(From: DOD Instruction 5000.2, 2002) 
A new MDAP follows the general path depicted in Figure 2.  A typical 
starting point is at Milestone B but a program can begin at a variety of points 
within the process depending on the maturity of the technology and/or concept 
involved. 
Once begun, a MDAP crosses milestones in order to proceed.  Milestones 
are "[those] points at which a recommendation is made and approval sought 
regarding starting or continuing an acquisition program."  (Defense Systems 
Management College, 2001).  The milestone decision authority (MDA) provides 
the approval or rejection, which for a MDAP is the USD (AT&L).  Milestone 
review and approval are a key method of oversight of a MDAP.  The Component 
Acquisition Executive is the Milestone Decision Authority for ACAT IC 
programs. 
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“The position of Program Executive Officer (PEO) was established in 
1986 based on the Packard Commission Report. A PEO is typically a one or two 
star general officer or senior executive service civilian equivalent responsible for 
the first line supervision of a group of like programs, each managed by a program 
manager.”(Defense Systems Management College, 2001).  All acquisition 
programs have a Program Manager (PM) designated who reports to a Program 
Executive Officer, who reports to an acquisition executive, who in turn reports to 
the USD (AT&L).  The PM is the lead for an integrated product team of 
individuals responsible for bringing a program from conception through 
deployment to disposal.  The PM’s reporting chain is depicted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Program Reporting Chain 
(From:  Defense Systems Management College, 2001) 
3. Information Technology Acquisition 
Prior to 1996, and in accordance with the Brooks Act of 1949, the 
acquisition of computer resources was the exclusive domain of the General 
Services Administration (GSA).  The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (formally 
known as The Information Technology Management Reform Act) gave IT 
procurement authority back to individual agencies, abolishing the Brooks Act.  It 
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also encouraged the use of commercial off the shelf (COTS) products and directed 
the appointment of Chief Information Officers within each Executive Agency.  
(Center for Information Technology, 2002)  
FAR Part 39 implements Section 5202 of the Clinger-Cohen Act directing 
the use of modular contracting in the acquisition of information technology to the 
"maximum extent practicable" (FAR Part 39).  Modular contracting is the "use of 
one or more contracts to acquire information technology systems in successive, 
interoperable increments."  (FAR Part 39)  The goal of modular contracting is to 
create IT acquisitions which are: 
• easier to manage   
• have an increased likelihood of success 
• provide solutions independent of subsequent increments 
• allow subsequent solutions to take advantage of new technology 
• reduce risk to the overall project (FAR Part 39) 
A Major Automated Information System (MAIS) is defined as "an AIS 
[automated information system] that is designated by ASD(C3I) as a MAIS, or 
estimated to require program costs in any single year in excess of $32 million in 
fiscal year (FY) 2000 constant dollars, total program costs in excess of $126 
million in FY 2000 constant dollars, or total life-cycle costs in excess of $378 
million in FY 2000 constant dollars" (DOD Instruction 5000.2, 2002).  The 
acquisition of information technology by DoD generally follows the same path 
and has the same oversight procedures as a MDAP. 
All MAIS programs are ACAT IAM or ACAT IAC.  The activities and 
oversight are nearly the same for a MAIS as they are for a MDAP.  The milestone 
decision authority for an ACAT IAM is the ASD (C3I).  The Component Chief 
Information Officer (CIO) is the MDA for an ACAT IAC program.  The 
Information Technology Overarching Integrated Product Team (IT OIPT) reviews 
ACAT IAM programs, while ACAT IAC programs go before a Component-level 
review.  Both ACAT IA programs have Program Executive Officers and Program 
Managers.   
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B. ACQUISITION OF SERVICES 
Services are identifiable tasks to be performed, rather than the 
delivery of an end item of supply.  (OMB, 1994) 
Service contract' means a contract that directly engages the time 
and effort of a contractor whose primary purpose is to perform an 
identifiable task rather than to furnish an end item of supply.  
(FAR, 2002)  
Large-scale contracts are usually part of a traditional acquisition program, 
in which case the PCO works for a PM.    
Acquisitions and contracting in general are guided by the annual Defense 
Authorization Acts.  DoD services are funded via the annual Defense 
Appropriation Bill and usually fall under the category of Operations and 
Maintenance (O&M).  
Once funded, the acquisition of services is governed primarily by the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and Executive Branch policy.  FAR Part 
37 specifically deals with service contracts and establishes responsibilities for 
implementing OFPP Policy Letter 93-1, Management Oversight of Service 
Contracting.  The principle size classification within the FAR is the Simplified 
Acquisition Threshold (SAT).   Established by the 1994 Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act, the threshold is $100,000 with a higher threshold of $200,000 
for contingency, humanitarian, or peacekeeping operations.  (FAR, 2002).  
Contract type is determined primarily by cost, risk, program needs and 
complexity of the acquisition. 
The flow of authority for contracting within DoD goes from the U.S. 
Congress, to the Head of Agency, to the senior procurement executive within that 
agency, to the head of the contracting activity, down to the procuring contracting 
officer (PCO).  Within the Department of the Navy, a large services contract will 




Among other responsibilities, the Head of Agency ensures:   
• Requirements for services are clearly defined and appropriate 
performance standards are developed 
• Service contractors are awarded and administered in such a manner 
that will provide the customer its goods and services of significant 
quality, on time and within budget 
• Specific procedures are in place when contracting for services to 
assure compliance with Government regulation 
All contracting officials are responsible for ensuring that best practice 
techniques are used when contracting for services. 
The Office of the Secretary of Defense has provided key considerations 
and lessons learned related to the acquisition of commercial items.  Among them 
was the lesson that "Programs often underestimate the impact of testing 
commercial items." "Often DoD application of commercial items requires 
qualification and operational testing and evaluation...to show that the items 
continue to perform as expected in unique military environments."   (Commercial 
Item Acquisition, 2000) 
C. PERFORMANCE BASED SERVICE CONTRACTS 
Performance-based contracting means structuring all aspects of an 
acquisition around the purpose of the work to be performed with 
the contract requirements set forth, in clear, specific, and objective 
terms with measurable outcomes as opposed to either the manner 
by which the work is to be performed or broad and imprecise 
statements of work.  (FAR, 2002) 
“Performance-based contracting is the preferred method for acquiring 
services” (FAR, 2002).  In fact, DoD is directed to use performance-based 
acquisitions to the maximum extent possible and for a major acquisition, can only 
be avoided by waiver.  The goals are to maximize competition and innovation by 
describing ‘what’ and not ‘how’ a task is to be completed.   
The key element to a performance-based contract is the statement of work, 
which defines the requirements and is tailored to the specific needs of an agency.  
Other important elements include: measurable performance standards, remedies to 
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handle performance that fails to meet those standards, and an assessment plan for 
measuring the contractor’s performance.  
As with all contracting, contract type is based upon the desire to maximize 
performance while minimizing cost and schedule i.e., risk.  
Fixed price contracts are appropriate for services that can be 
objectively defined and for which risk of performance is 
manageable.  Cost reimbursement contracts are appropriate for 
services that can only be defined in general terms and for which 
the risk of performance is not reasonably manageable. (OMB, 
1998)   
D. MULTIYEAR CONTRACTS 
A multiyear contract is defined as "a contract for purchase of property or 
services for more than one but not more than five, program years."  (U.S.C. Title 
10, Section 2306b)  FAR Part 17 describe the requirements for a multiyear 
contract as: 
• substantial cost savings 
• stable requirement 
• stable design 
• stable funding 
• accurate estimates of costs 
The use of this method of contracting is intended to: 
• lower cost  
• enhance standardization 
• reduced administrative burden 
• encourage continuity of production 
• stabilize the contractor workforce 
• reduce the number of quality control techniques established 
• broaden the competitive base 
• incentivize contractors to improve productivity  (FAR, 2002) 
"A multi-year contract...may not be awarded until the head of the agency 
gives written notification of the proposed contract and of the proposed 
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cancellation ceiling for that contract to the committees on armed services and 
appropriations of the House of Representatives and Senate. The contract may not 
be awarded until the thirty-first day after the date of notification."  (FAR, 2002)   
D. NAVY-MARINE CORPS INTRANET 
...agencies yield ownership, support and daily management 
headaches of IT assets and platforms to contractors.  But the end-
users of the PCs and other resources provided by contractors 
remain government employees.  (GCN Industry Talks Up Seat, 
2002)      
NMCI is a $6.9 billion (minimum) performance-based services contract 
awarded to Electronic Data Systems Corporation (EDS) on 6 Oct 2000.  Its 
purpose is to make wide spread disparate data centrally available, reduce 
approximately 100,000 legacy applications to about 1,000 and integrate 
approximately 3,000 separate networks into a single planned community 
encompassing the nearly 400,000 men and women of the Department of the Navy.   
NMCI began life as the Navy Virtual Intranet in 1997.  This transitioned 
into the Navy Wide Intranet the following year.  It transitioned again in 1999 to 
become the Navy Intranet.  Later in 1999 when it incorporated the Marine Corps 
it became NMCI. 
The contract is an Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) Firm-
Fixed Price (FFP) contract with incentives based on performance.  It has a five 
year base with a three year option period.  The Navy based the authority for use of 
a contract on the multiyear contract portion of Section 2306, Chapter 137 of Title 
10 of the United States Code (U.S.C.).  The Navy "feared that using a 
requirements contract or similar contracting vehicle would kick off a long budget 
battle with Congress that would eventually result in the service buying obsolete 
systems."  (Orr, 2001)  The Navy decided it was time to treat IT as a recurring 
cost in the same manner as utilities are accounted for.  
EDS was awarded the contract as the prime contractor over IBM Global 
Services, Computer Sciences, and General Dynamics.  The principle 
subcontractors are Raytheon, CISCO, MCI WorldCom, Wam!Net, Dell, and 
13 
Microsoft.  The contract goal is to subcontract at least 40% of contract services to 
small businesses along with women and minority owned businesses. (NMCI 
Contract, 2000) 
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(After:  NMCI Contract, 2000) 
For the individual user, the key to the NMCI contract is the seat.  A seat 
typically consists of: 
PC, network, security hardware, software, hardware/software 
maintenance, hard-ware/software refresh, email, Web access, two 
unclassified user accounts, LAN/WAN/MAN connectivity, 
NIPRNET access, help desk support, desk-side support, shared 
network printing, network file sharing, directory services, training, 
50MB email/calendar storage per account, and 200MB network 
personal file storage per account.   
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There are several variations of the “seat” depending on specific user needs 
such as working on a classified network or providing service to a deploying or 
mobile user. 
 Acknowledging the rate at which IT technology can perish, hardware 
refresh rates are designed to occur every three years and software is to be updated 
as new versions appear.  This compares very favorably with the Marine Corps 
Common Hardware Suite (MCCHS), which had a hardware refresh rate of every 
five years. 
At the heart of the contract are the 137 Service Level Agreements (SLA) 
between the Navy and EDS.  These serve to define what services will be 
provided, how they will be measured, and what happens if service targets are met 
or not met. 
Oversight and execution for NMCI was shared between several agencies 
and organizations.  Principle oversight belonged to the Department of the Navy’s 
Program Executive Office - Information Technology (PEO-IT) located within the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy Research Development and 
Acquisition (ASN RD&A).  It was through this office that the request for 
proposals was issued and the subsequent award made.  Policy, strategy and 
governance oversight was provided by a senior level leadership council, which 
provided "department-wide recommendations to the Secretary, the DON Chief 
Information Office, the Navy's Director of Space, Information, Command and 
Control Directorate (OPNAV N6) and the USMC's Director C4."  (Peeters, 2000)  
Commander, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) was 
tasked to do the purchasing and evaluation of the implementation for the Navy; 
and Marine Corps Systems Command performed that function for the Marine 
Corps.  A task force was stood up to manage operations in the U.S. Navy; and 
Director C4 managed operations for the Marine Corps.   
Funding for NMCI was to be provided through the IT budget of the 
Department of the Navy.  In 2001, the DoN budgeted $3.46 billion for IT overall.  
It estimated that it would apply $1.62 billion of that budget toward NMCI in that 
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year alone.  Currently, cost per seat under NCMI is approximately $4,179 
(Dorobek, 15 Jul 2002).  This compares with a pre-NMCI cost for similar services 
of $4,286 per seat.  Under the original contract no additional funds or specific line 
items were requested of Congress.     
E. SUMMARY  
“Contracting for services is especially complex and demands close 
collaboration between procurement personnel and the users...” (OMB, 1994). 
DoD has an elaborate system for the acquisition of the goods and services 
it needs to carry out its mission.  Current policy is to use performance-based 
acquisition to the maximum extent possible.  Yet, even within performance-based 
acquisition, there are distinct differences between the acquisition of products and 
the acquisition of services.  The acquisition of products has a very elaborate and 
detailed oversight structure, which also serves to make it relatively transparent to 
and controllable by Congress.  The acquisition of services has considerably less 
structure.  Services acquisition is traditionally viewed as an internal affair much 
of which is conducted out of the sight of Congress. 
While NMCI was transformational in some respects, it was also viewed 
and treated by the Department of the Navy as a routine performance-based 






III. DATA  
A. INTRODUCTION 
It is not a technical challenge.  But from the standpoint of political 
and cultural issues, it never ceases to amaze.  (Tom Scruggs, 
official in the office of the CIO, Department of the Navy) 
While the Department of the Navy may have had a rather simple vision of 
what NMCI was, Congress took a different view.  Partially because of the 
implications of this contract, Congress took a number of steps to regain oversight 
of this program.  These efforts have forced DoD to make some changes as well.  
This chapter explores what Congress has passed and desires to pass 
concerning services acquisition, and what Congress has said specifically 
concerning NMCI.  This chapter also details what the DoD and the DoN are 
proposing for new policy to govern this type of acquisition.  Finally, this chapter 
describes commercial best practices for the acquisition of large-scale service 
requirements.  
B. CONGRESSIONAL SERVICE ACQUISITION ACTION 
1. Service Contract Act of 1965 
The McNamara-O'Hara Services Act or Service Contract Act of 1965 is 
one of Congress' earliest specific legislation attempts to govern service 
acquisitions.  This Act primarily "governs wages, fringe benefits and the pricing 
of service contracts for other than professional services."  (Hughes, 2001) 
2. Defense Authorization Act 
 The Secretary of Defense shall establish and implement a 
management structure for the procurement of services for the 
Department of Defense.  The management structure shall be 
comparable to the management structure that applies to the 
procurement of products by the Department.   (Public Law 107-
107, 2001) 
The FY 2002 National Defense Authorization Act included specific 
language intended to improve the Department of Defense's management of the 
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acquisition of services by requiring the establishment of a management structure 
for purchases of services; by directing the collection and analysis of data on   
purchases of services; and by establishing a program review process for major 
purchases of services. (House Report 107-333, 2001)  The management structure 
for services acquisition was to be similar to what was in place for product 
acquisition.  The Secretary was to provide for an official in each military 
department to exercise responsibility for the management of the procurement of 
services.  Also, the Secretary was to “establish specific dollar thresholds and other 
criteria for advance approvals of purchases.”  (Public Law 107-107, 2001)      
3. Services Acquisition Reform Act 
In fiscal year 2001 alone, the federal government acquired about  
$109 billion in services.  Our work, as well as the work of other 
oversight agencies, continues to find that millions of service 
contract dollars are at risk...because acquisitions are poorly 
planned, not adequately competed, or poorly managed.  (GAO, 7 
Mar 2002) 
The Service Acquisition Reform Act (SARA) was introduced in the U.S. 
House of Representatives on 4 Mar 2002.  According to its author, Mr. Davis; 
Representative of Virginia, SARA was intended to help Federal agencies 
overcome any obstacles preventing them from getting the goods and services they 
needed.  Federal purchases of complex services such as large scale IT 
modernization continue to result in high failure rates. This bill is deemed 
necessary because, “while acquisition reform touched on service contracting, it 
was not the emphasis of those efforts.” (GAO, The Next Steps, 22 May 2002) 
A key provision of this bill, as it relates to this thesis’ research, is the 
instruction to the head of each agency to appoint a Chief Acquisition Officer 
(CAO), making acquisition that person’s primary function.  This is a provision 
modeled after commercial practices and according to Mr. Davis, it enables 
significant cost savings and leverages DoD's purchasing power. 
[Author’s note: as of the date of this thesis, SARA is still pending passage, 
and is still being reviewed by DoD and industry.]  
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4. Congress and NMCI   
The way the DoD is funding this is the way corporations do it 
everyday...it's a new model for the Hill and it doesn't necessarily 
require oversight....  (Verton, 2000)  
In a February 2000 letter to then Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig, 
Herbert Bateman, representative from Virginia and chairman of the House Armed 
Services Subcommittee on Military Readiness, asked the Navy to halt NMCI 
procurement.  He voiced his concern over a lack of documentation and 
complained, "initiatives of this proportion need a complete financial analysis and 
thorough discussion and resolution to policy issues.  The Navy has done neither."  
He further stated that, “programs and initiatives of such large proportions must be 
analyzed and reviewed thoroughly.  For this reason, I request that you delay the 
acquisition and implementation until it...is included in the future budget request 
and receives the proper level of congressional oversight.”  (Hasson, 24 Feb 200)   
In March 2000, the House Armed Services Committee notified the 
Department of the Navy that it "disagreed with the Navy's approach...”, and said 
that, “a contract of this magnitude constitutes a major acquisition..."  (Verton, 13 
Mar 2000) 
In joint subcommittee hearings of the House Armed Services Committee, 
Congress questioned where the funding for NMCI was going to come from.    At 
the request of the Military Research and Development Subcommittee of the 
HASC, the General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted an analysis of NMCI.  
In its subsequent report, it charged that the Navy: 
• Did not develop a formal analysis of program alternatives nor 
conduct a business case analysis 
• Did not resolve key programmatic issues such as how the Intranet 
was to be managed, funded, what was to happen to current 
technology and IT personnel 
• Did not take risk mitigation steps such as testing the proposed 
approach on a smaller scale  (GAO, 8 Mar 2000) 
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GAO also charged that the OSD did not: 
• Define how it would oversee program requirements 
• Establish that NMCI would be consistent with DoD's other 
command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence 
systems   (GAO, 8 Mar 2000) 
The GAO reported back to Congress that, "The...[DOD 5000.2-R]...serves 
as a general model for acquisition programs that do not meet the definition of a 
major automated information system...in the absence of an agreed upon oversight 
process we have looked to the 5000 series of documents for guidance..."   (GAO, 
8 Mar 2000).  Based on this, it did not understand the Navy's departure from the 
5000 series instructions. 
In its 2001 Defense Appropriations Act, Congress blocked spending on 
NMCI pending the completion of a laundry list of new requirements.  Among 
them was the requirement to implement NMCI in distinct phases or milestones 
with operational testing and cost reviews occurring with each phase.  The 
milestones were event driven as follows: 
• Initial order...60,000 seats 
• Milestone 1...an additional 100,000 seats (160,000 seats ordered in 
total) 
• Milestone 2...an additional 150,00 seats (310,000 seats ordered in 
total) 
• Milestone 3...101,000 seats (411,000 seats ordered in total) 
Milestone approval authority was designated as the Chief Information 
Officer of the Department of Defense and Comptroller of the Department of 
Defense.  In addition, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Navy Operations 
had to report to Congress that continued implementation of NMCI was in the best 
interest of the Department of the Navy.  Also, Congress specifically directed that 
acquisition of NMCI be managed in accordance with the requirements of DOD 
Directive 5000.1 and DOD Regulation 5000.2-R.   
Still not pleased with the information coming from the DoN on NMCI, the 
2002 Appropriations Act was even more specific.  In it, Congress retained the 
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event driven implementation of NMCI, granting the Secretary of the Navy 
authority to continue up to a point but subjected progress contingent to approval 
and certifications by the USD (AT&L) and the DoD CIO.  Congress also directed, 
“The Secretary of the Navy shall assign an employee of the Department of the 
Navy to the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet program whose sole responsibility will 
be to oversee and direct the program.  The employee so assigned may not also be 
the program executive officer.”  (Public Law 107-107).  In essence, Congress 
directed the Navy to stand up a traditional Program Manager for NMCI separate 
from the existing Program Executive Office. 
As an added precaution, Congress attempted to close the door on future 
NMCI-like contracts by adding the following provisions: 
• none of the funds provided in this Act shall be available to initiate 
a multiyear contract...in excess of $20 million in any one year of 
the contract...unless the congressional defense committees have 
been notified...in advance of the proposed contract award 
• ...no part of any appropriation contained in this Act shall be 
available to initiate multiyear procurement contracts for any 
systems or component thereof if the value of the multiyear contract 
would exceed $500 million...   (Public Law 107-117, 2002) 
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During the 2003 budget session, Congress continues to closely monitor the 
implementation of NMCI.  In working up the 2003 Defense Appropriations Act, 
the House Appropriations Committee included “a general provision that prohibits 
the Navy from ordering additional seats above the current 160,000 authorized by 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and requires that operational test and 
evaluation be conducted once there has been a full transition of not less than 
20,000 workstations to the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet.  The Committee believes 
that the delay in seat orders that will result will also provide the Navy and the 
contractor much needed time to address the legacy application problems which 
will arise from the order of the first 160,000 seats.”  (House Report 107-532, 
2002).  The latest Congress remains committed to incremental implementation for 
NMCI and feels that the DoN is still proceeding too fast.  Congress is using its 
appropriations authority to slow the Navy's implementation of NMCI.  In order to 
provide assistance, Congress authorized in the 2003 Appropriations bill the 
extension of the NMCI contract from five to seven years.  This was done to allow 
for delays caused by testing, the handling and integration of hundreds of legacy 
applications and any difficulties with transference of control over to the 
contractor.     
C. PROPOSED DOD SERVICE ACQUISITION POLICY 
In January of 2001, the DoD released the guidebook Performance-Based 
Services Acquisition.  This guidebook was intended to: 
• promote performance-based strategies for services acquisitions 
• educate the acquisition workforce 
• encourage innovative business practices within the DoD 
acquisition process 
• promote the use of the commercial market place 
• increase awareness that performance-based services acquisitions 
require participation from all stakeholders  (Gansler, 2001) 
In conjunction with the guidebook, DoD also initiated the policy requiring 
that "50% of all services acquisitions must meet the Performance Based Services 
Acquisition standards by 2005."  (Oliver, 2001)  This policy also established an 
ongoing Integrated Process Team (IPT) co-chaired by the Deputy USD 
(Acquisition Reform) and the Director, Acquisition Resources and Analysis, and 
focused on Services Acquisition.  The first task of this IPT was to "extend to the 
acquisition of services a program review structure similar to the one the 
Department has for the acquisition of systems."  (Oliver, 2001)  
In conformance with the National Defense Act of FY 2002, the USD 
(AT&L) called for a review of all DoD acquisitions of services whether they were 
embedded within a traditional weapons acquisition or not.  He specifically 
directed: 
• Decision Authorities to establish mandatory procedures for 
assigned service acquisitions 
• Decision Authorities [to] tailor procedures based on size and 
complexity of a specific service acquisition...[consistent with 
statutory requirements] 
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• DoD Components [to] establish a review process that provides for 
consistent review and approval of service acquisitions 
• The creation of a documented acquisition strategy in support of 
each proposed service acquisition (USD (AT&L) Review of 
Acquisition of Services, 2002) 
Key personnel identified for review responsibilities were USD (AT&L), 
ASD (C3I), Component Acquisition Executive, and the Head of Contracting 
Activity or such designated individual in each Service/Agency.  Review 
thresholds were assigned as depicted in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.   Services Acquisitions Review Thresholds 
Review 
Authority 
Programs FY 2000 
Constant Dollars 
USD(AT&L) • Designated Programs 
• Programs of Special Interest
$2 billion or greater 
ASD(C3I) • Programs of Special Interest $378M Life Cycle Cost or
$126M Total Program 
CAE or HCA • Designated Programs 
• Programs of Special Interest
$0.5 billion - $2 billion 
Designated 
Official 
• Designated Programs Below $0.5 billion 
(After:  USD(AT&L) Review of Acquisition of Services) 
In addition to the call for Services Acquisitions to be reviewed, USD 
(AT&L) directed each military component to propose a Services Contracts 
Oversight Process detailing "process and procedures for their management and 
oversight of...all acquisitions of services."  His charge to DoD was "to treat the 
acquisition of services as seriously as we do the acquisition of hardware."  
(Aldridge, 2002) 
D. PROPOSED U.S. NAVY & U.S. MARINE CORPS SERVICE 
ACQUISITION POLICY 
The draft of the DoN's Services Contracts Oversight Process states, 
"oversight of services within DoN is the shared responsibility of requiring 
activities, contracting activities and the DoN Service Acquisition Executive 
(SAE)."  (Schneider, 2002)  The DoN's approach to services acquisition oversight 
closely mirrors the review process proposed by USD (AT&L).  See  Figure 3. 
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Along with these review thresholds, DoN Program Executive Officers, 
Program Managers and HCAs are directed to "establish review procedures 
commensurate with [this] process."  (Schneider, 2002) 
 
Figure 3. Draft DoN Service Acquisition Thresholds 
(From:  Schneider, 2002) 
 
E. COMMERCIAL INDUSTRIES' ACQUISITION OF LARGE-
SCALE SERVICES  
In 2000, about $2.1 trillion in services...was sold in the U.S. 
market place." (GAO, Jan 2002)... leading companies have been 
examining alternative ways to manage their service spending [in 
order] to stay competitive, respond to market and stockholder 
pressures, and deal with economic downturns...  (GAO, Jan 2002) 
In January of 2002, the GAO, at the behest of the US Senate 
Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed 
Services, reported on the best practices of commercial industry in the acquisition 
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of services.  It noted that just as service acquisitions were growing in number 
among Federal agencies, they were also growing significantly within the private 
sector to the tune of $2.1 trillion in 2000 alone.  The GAO noted, "the leading 
companies we studied made a number of dramatic changes to the way they bought 
services and found that these changes, in turn resulted in significant cost savings 
and service improvements."  (GAO, Jan 2002).  The companies studied in the 
January report were Brunswick Corporation, The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation, 
EDS, Exxon Mobil Corporation, Hasbro, Inc and Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. 
Brunswick Corporation is "a global leader in the leisure products 
industry." (MSN, Brunswick Corporation, 2002).  Its products range from boating 
and marine engines to fitness equipment and bowling.  From Sep 2001 to Sep 
2002 it had $3.4 billion is sales and $63 million in income. 
The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation (currently called D&B) is "a leading 
provider of business credit, marketing and purchasing information and receivables 
management services." (GAO Jan 2002).  From Sep 2001 to Sep 2002 it had $1.3 
billion in sales and $131.4 million in income. 
EDS is the largest independent systems management and services firm in 
the US, second only to IBM worldwide.  From Sep 2001 to Sep 2002 it had $22.3 
billion in sales and $1.3 billion in income. 
Exxon Mobile Corporation is the world's largest integrated oil company.   
From Sep 2001 to Sep 2002 it had $174.9 billion in sales and $16.2 billion in 
income. 
Hasbro, Inc. is the #2 toy maker in the U.S.  From Sep 2001 to Sep 2002 it 
had $2.9 billion in sales and $60.1 million in income. 
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. is a leading provider of investment, financing, 
advisory, insurance and related products and services.  From Sep 2001 to Sep 
2002 it had $31.4 billion in sales and $439 million in income. 
These firms are all leaders in their respective markets.  Also, they have  
recently reengineered their approaches to acquiring services to leverage their 
25 
buying power, reduce cost, better manage their service providers and improve the 
quality of services acquired.  While these firms did not take the same approach, 
key to each of their turnarounds appears to be the "strategic approach."  (GAO, 
Mar 2002). 
The strategic approach in this case involves recognizing the criticality of 
the purchase of services and moving that activity from an ancillary level to a core 
business.  Each of these firms began to actively involve senior management in the 
direction, vision, goals and targets related to service acquisition.   
The broad principles, which fall under strategic approach, are 
commitment, knowledge, change, and support.  This includes activities such as 
"developing a better picture of what the company is spending on services, taking 
an enterprise wide approach and developing new ways of doing business."  
(GAO, Jan 2002)   
 The four common principles and practices of these leading firms as noted 
by the GAO are: 
• Securing up front commitment from top leaders 
• Obtaining improved knowledge on service spending 
• Creating supporting structure, processes, and roles 
• Enabling success through sustained leadership, communication, 
and metrics  (GAO, Jan 2002) 
These firms all realized that they needed more information on this “new” 
core business.  They all sought to answer basic questions of “how much was 
being spent and where the dollars were going.”  (GAO, Jan 2002)  Financial and 
management systems were shifted from focusing merely on detailed information 
on components and raw materials to also providing details of services acquired.  
This data was “used to identify opportunities to rationalize supplier base and 
reduce costs.”  (GAO, Jan 2002)  Each of these companies found it necessary to 
go “from a fragmented approach to doing business to one that was more 
coordinated and strategically-oriented.”  (GAO, Jan 2002)   
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Related to the previous point, the companies studied by GAO “generally 
restructured their procurement organizations.”  (GAO, Jan 2002)  The main 
change was to elevate the procurement organization giving it “greater 
responsibility and authority for strategic planning and management and oversight 
of the companies’ service spending.”  (GAO, Jan 2002) 
Success of the strategic approach was seen as dependent upon: continued 
support of senior management; timely, two-way communication; and use of 
metrics to evaluate performance, set goals and document results. 
F. OTHER FEDERAL SERVICE ACQUISITIONS 
The MITRE Corporation was tasked by the U.S. Coast Guard to provide 
lessons learned from “prior large-scale [IT] modernization programs that could be 
applied to...[the Coast Guard IT modernization]...program.  The MITRE report 
reviewed the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA), the U.S. Customs Service (Customs), and the U.S. Postal Service (USPS). 
“The Internal Revenue Service is the nation's tax collection agency and 
administers the Internal Revenue Code enacted by Congress.  In 2000, the IRS 
collected more than $2 trillion in revenue and processed 226 million tax returns.”  
(IRS, 2002)  From 1986 to 2001, the Internal Revenue Service spent more than $8 
billion on tax systems modernization.  The GAO concluded that the efforts were 
“at serious risk due to...pervasive management and technical weaknesses...”  
(Gomperts, 2001)  Among the lessons learned were: 
• The need to provide a modernization framework, define roles, 
responsibilities and processes and delineate a decision making 
process 
• The need to insure that modernization plans to be inclusive and 
achievable 
• The requirement to seek external help if requisite skills do not exist 
in-house 
• The benefit of the use of business cases to justify continuing 
projects at milestone reviews 
• The requirement to actively engage oversight organizations.  
(Gomperts, 2001) 
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“The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is the element of the U.S. 
government with primary responsibility for the safety of civil aviation.”  (FAA, 
2002)  The FAA’s modernization program was a “complex system of systems” 
(Gomperts, 2001) effort dating back to 1981 and was projected to cost $45 billion 
through FY2005.  GAO’s review of their efforts pinpointed the following 
problems: 
• Immature software acquisition capabilities 
• Lack of a complete systems architecture 
• Inadequate cost estimating and cost accounting 
• Lack of an effective CIO management structure 
• Ineffective investment management process 
• An organization structure that impaired the acquisition process 
(Gomperts, 2001) 
"The United States Customs Service (Customs) is the primary 
enforcement agency protecting the Nation’s borders." (Customs, 2002)  "It 
annually collects more than $20 billion in revenues, processes more than 12 
million formal entries a year...[and] monitors an average of 10 million shipments 
and processes nearly 450 million passengers entering the United States." 
Customs began a modernization program in 1994 with incremental 
deployment through 2005.  Early GAO reviews highlighted several concerns 
including: 
• Lack of an effective management and oversight structure 
• An incomplete information systems [enterprise architecture] 
• Unstructured processes for IT investment management and 
systems acquisition 
• Ineffective software acquisition and development processes 
(Gomperts, 2001) 
According to U.S. Code, Title 39, Section 101,  
The United States Postal Service shall be operated as a basic and 
fundamental service provided to the people by the Government of 
the United States, authorized by the Constitution, created by Act of 
Congress, and supported by the people.  The Postal Service shall 
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have as its basic function the obligation to provide postal services 
to bind the Nation together through the personal, educational, 
literary, and business correspondence of the people.   
In 2001, the United States Postal Service (USPS) handled 207.5 billion 
pieces of mail on operating revenue of $65.8 billion.  Beginning in 1986, the 
USPS initiated the Point-of-Sale Retail Sales (POS ONE) Program "to replace a 
legacy point-of-sale system at 10,000 sites with a state-of-the-art, wide-area 
system."  (Gomperts, 2001)  The program has spent $650 million through 2001 
and estimates spending another $150 to $200 million through 2003.  The USPS 
views the program as a success.  Attributes that contribute to the success of the 
program include: 
• A strong program office, led by an empowered program manager  
• A robust communications and requirements tracking system 
• Use of functional experts at the contractors' facilities 
• A Vice-President's Oversight Committee along with strong USPS 
senior management support  (Gomperts, 2001) 
Common characteristics found in all of the successful programs included: 
• A strong program office staffed by people with management and 
technical expertise  
• Strong contract management and a good partnership among all 
program management office elements 
• Good relations and mutual expectations among oversight 
organizations  (Gomperts, 2001) 
G. SUMMARY 
Service acquisition is not new.  Congress passed the Service Contract Act 
in 1965, but the growing use of this type of acquisition, particularly by DoD, has 
caused Congress to review it.  Congress is apparently not finished.  The proposed 
Services Acquisition Reform Act looks to fill in the gaps left after previous 
acquisition reform efforts.   
NMCI, which arguably started the latest Congressional service acquisition 
fervor, has received explicit attention.  Congress has essentially restructured 
NMCI from a traditional service contract.   
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The commercial sector has several lessons learned to offer with regards to 
service acquisitions.  Major firms such as EDS, Exxon, Merrill Lynch and others 
have separately agreed upon common principles such as securing commitment 
from leadership, taking a strategic approach and utilitzing a strong program 
office.  All of these have implications or applications for NMCI, which are 
explored in the next chapter. 
[Author's Note:  On 29 Aug 2002, draft memoranda from the Secretary of 
Defense began circulating regarding the DoD 5000 series.  In the memorandum to 
top DoD officials, the Secretary expressed his dissatisfaction with the current 
documents and directed their cancellation and the preparation of revised 
documentation.  In a subsequent draft memorandum, Defense Acquisition System 
and Operation the Defense Acquisition System, the Secretary provided interim 
guidance enabling the DoD to continue functioning until permanent 
documentation can be issued. 
The revised documentation is estimated to be roughly 30 pages in length 
compared to the nearly 200 pages of the current series.  It will offer a streamlined 
approach to acquisition along the lines of what is currently used by the Missile 
Defense Agency.  Key tenants of the new acquisition policy will be: 
• Decentralized responsibility 
• Program mangers allowed to tailor the purchase process 
• Technology drives continuous improvements 
• Program mangers work more closely with units that will use the 
weapons 
• Test and evaluation requirement incorporated throughout 
development 
• Analysis of alternatives to meet a need 
• Competitive bids 
• Use of commercial technologies where available 
• Contractors encouraged to develop realistic cost and schedule 
goals.   (DOD Update, 13 Sep 2002) 
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On 30 October 2002, the Deputy Secretary of Defense signed and released 
the interim guidance for Defense acquisitions.  The documents released were The 
Defense Acquisition System and the Operation of the Defense Acquisition 
System.   
With regards to the acquisition of services, the interim guidance states, 
All service acquisitions shall utilize a strategic approach [which] 
includes the development of a picture of what the DoD is spending 
on services, an enterprise-wide approach to procuring services, and 
the development of new ways of doing business.  (Appendix C) 
The guidance also states that,  
Each acquisition of services shall have:  A documented acquisition 
strategy, updated when changes occur; metrics for cost, schedule 
and performance; and an approved data system for the collection 
and reporting of required data.  (Appendix C) 
...the management level shall be determined using the total planned 








   





















IV. ANALYSIS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
It’s not everyday that The U.S. Congress takes so hands-on a role 
in an IT project.  But NMCI might be the bellwether Seat 
implementation furthering the cause of ‘service level’ IT 
contracting broadly across government. (GCN, NMCI Bellwether, 
7 Aug 2002) 
Before service level IT contracting or other forms of service acquisitions 
spread broadly across Government, some important issues will need to be 
resolved.  Key terms which are associated with service acquisition are not 
adequately defined which could lead to inconsistant application.  Caution must be 
exercised in using a common instrument such as multiyear contracting, for service 
acquisitions.      
B. ACQUISITION OF SERVICES 
Service acquisitions are not viewed on the same level as MDAPs or 
MAISs.  Despite Congress' call for a management structure similar to what is in 
place for product acquisition, neither the old 5000 series instructions, nor the 
interim guidance for Defense acquisition, reflect such a management structure for 
service acquisitions.  This may be reflective of a lack of definition regarding just 
what is a service acquisition.   
Both the interim guidance and pending Service policy determine 
management level for the acquisition of services based on total dollar value.  
There is no explicit consideration for the function or criticality of a service.  Other 
than dollar value, there is no distinction made between a service contract and a 
service acquisition.  A service, which provides a core function such as NMCI, will 
be managed the same way as a service providing an ancillary function such as 
base laundry service, if the dollar values match.  Obviously base laundry service 
is not of the same criticality to an agencies mission success as its information 
technology architecture. 
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The expression "strategic approach" is used in both the interim guidance 
for Defense acquisitions and in the USD(AT&L)'s charge to DoD officials.  It is a 
key goal of DoD service acquisitions and its use reflects the application of lessons 
learned from the study of best practices from the commercial sector.  The 
expression is not formally defined by the DoD.  This could lead to varying 
interpretation, or worse, varying application of this key attribute.  What is 
commonly given are attributes or factors of the strategic approach.  DoDs version 
of the strategic approach differs from that of the commercial sector as shown in 
Chapter III.  A key attribute from the commercial sector, making service 
acquisition a core-business, is missing from the attributes described by DoD.  This 
could have the unintended consequence of lowering the importance of critical 
service acquisitions such as NMCI. 
It should be noted that raising the acquisition of services to a core function 
runs the risk of crossing the line into inherently governmental functions.  An 
argument could be made that if an activity is a core function of a Government 
entity, it is also inherently governmental.  This is a danger that the commercial 
sector does not have to consider when it raises the scope and value of its service 
acquisition activities. 
While OSD has previously highlighted the danger of under testing 
commercial items and warned of the dangers of incorporating those items into 
defense acquisitions, the area of testing of commercial services remains 
understudied.  The assumption exists that commercial products are tested and 
evaluated by the market place and therefore do not require further testing.  
Lessons learned from acquisitions involving commercial items indicate that the 
intended application of an item is as important as the source of that item.  A 
military application can undo a perfect product.  There is no reason to assume 
differently for a commercial service.     
C. NMCI  
1. Multiyear Contracts 
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The Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) is at its heart a multi-year 
Performance Based Service Contract, but its size and scope gives pause to many.  
As an example of a large-scale service acquisition, NMCI raises important 
questions and implications.   
As presented in a previous chapter, the requirements for a multiyear 
contract from FAR Part 17 are: 
• substantial cost savings 
• stable requirement 
• stable design 
• stable funding 
While current data does suggest some initial cost savings are being 
achieved by NMCI, the total savings achieved can only be assessed in the future.  
The design and intent of NMCI is to achieve those savings in several ways.  First, 
via use of a Fixed-Price contract vehicle, thereby levying a considerable amount 
of risk on the contractor.  Second, by use of a single prime contractor, thereby 
achieving savings based on an economic order of scale and learning curve.  Third, 
by the inclusion of regular technology upgrades, thereby saving the Department of 
the Navy from separately trying to keep up with technology.  (Clarke, K, 2001)  
Initial reviews are favorable (Dorobek, 15 Jul 2002).   
The requirement for NMCI is not nearly as stable as it seemed.  While the 
use of information technology and the need for an IT infrastructure to support that 
use is unquestioned, the details of what constitutes the current IT infrastructure, 
and what will have to be subsumed by NMCI, has not been nearly as harmonious.  
There has been a gradual revelation of additional legacy systems, “at one 
point…tallied [at] nearly 100,000 separate applications” (Dorobek, NMCI Feels 
Appropriations Bite, 8 Jul 2002).  This is one of the sources of the U.S. Congress’ 
concerns over NMCI, and what has inspired much of the U.S. Congress’ response. 
As a service contract, there is not a design in the traditional use of the 
term.  The contract itself, as described by both the DoN and Electronic Data 
Systems Corp (EDS), is a “living document” and “a work in progress” (Harris, 
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May 2001).  Even if the architecture settles into place, this unique contract vehicle 
would seem to contradict the statutory requirement for a stable design.   
A stable design is also meant to mitigate technical risk.  The scope of 
NMCI invites considerable risk.  NMCI literally cannot fail, nor can it be easily 
canceled.  Unlike a traditional weapons system, which if cancelled, pays off the 
contractor and moves on to the next issue, NMCI will become the life-blood of 
the DoN.  If an airplane program is canceled, the U.S. Air Force does not cease to 
operate; cancel an artillery piece and the U.S. Army does not fold.  If NMCI is 
canceled, the DoN will have to completely replace it in order to continue 
functioning.  Each year that NMCI implementation proceeds, the harder it will be 
for the DoN to do anything else but NMCI.  Although recent statements by the 
NMCI Program Manager suggest that there is a contingency plan in the event that 
EDS or any of the other major contractors supporting NMCI were unable to 
execute the contract there remains significant risk. 
With cost estimates ranging from $6.9 billion to as high as $16 billion 
over ten years, the U.S. Congress is very concerned about where the funding is 
going to come from.  The DoN’s plan to redirect Operations and Maintenance 
funds from the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps already ear-marked for IT did 
not impress Congress as a stable funding source.  Since the requirement in terms 
of legacy system support was growing, the concern was that the costs were 
underestimated and that sooner or later the DoN was going to have to go back to 
Congress to get additional funding or risk draining funds from other programs. 
2. Modular Contracts 
As discussed in Chapter II, FAR Part 39 directs the use of one or more 
contracts or modular contracting to acquire information technology systems in 
successive, interoperable increments.  NMCI obviously does not take this 
approach but rather uses a phased implementation of a single contract to meet its 
comprehensive goals.  This raises the question of how do you balance the 
integration requirements of IT with the desire and requirement to conduct IT 
acquisitions in a manageable manner?    
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3. Program Management 





• CTF NMCI 
• HQMC C4 
• Senior Level Leadership Council  
This is in clear opposition to documented best practices, which stress the 
utilization of a strong program office led by an empowered program manager.  
This was clearly a concern of Congress. 
The acquisition of IT services is different from other service acquisitions 
in that they will usually involve a core business function, i.e., information 
management.  The failure of such an acquisition will have a catastrophic effect on 
an organization.  Oversight commensurate with managing a core business 
function is required.   
The fact that IT obsolesces quickly merely adds emphasis to a key tenant 
of service contracts, that they be employed for reoccurring needs.  The short 
lifecycle of IT means that the procuring contracting officer must pay particular 
attention to the part of the statement of objectives dealing with component and 
software upgrades.   
Configuration control is also a critical issue in large scale IT service 
acquisitions.  The danger is in upgrading merely to capture the latest and greatest 
device without factoring in interoperability, utility or usability.  Interoperability, 
i.e., does the new IT being provided work with what is already in place and with 
the other IT systems that the customer has to interact with?  Utility, i.e., does it do 
the job for which it was needed?  Usability, i.e., it may do the job better than 
anything else but can the customer figure it out and make practical use of it?       
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4. Congressional Direction 
While not every NMCI delay can be attributed to Congressional action, 
such action has, in fact, delayed and restructured the program.  The delays began 
right from the beginning.  Contract award, which was originally planned for June 
2000, was delayed to October 2000 by the vocal concerns of the U.S. Congress.  
The testing and reporting mandated by Congress in its 2001 Defense 
Authorization bill also forced the DoN to delay implementation.  Key to the delay 
was the question of what do you test when you acquire commercial services.  A 
subsequent agreement allowed the NMCI to continue but ensured that a full 
operational testing and evaluation cycle would be performed within the fiscal 
year.           
In addition, Congress exercised its power of the purse strings.  The 2002 
Defense authorization trimmed NMCI from $647 million to $527 (Onley, 13 Aug 
2001).   For the 2003 budget, the authorization trimmed NMCI from $1.4 billion 
down to just $691 million (Onley, 2002).  Congressional concerns over the 
handling of legacy systems, testing, service, use of inferior equipment and the 
potential of lost data by NMCI are all reasons behind the budget cuts. 
D. SUMMARY   
Congress will closely scrutinize future service acquisitions.  With the 2001 
Defense Authorization Bill, Congress lowered the threshold for multiyear 
contracts down to $20 million per year or Five Hundred Dollars for a single year 
new award.  Congress is aware that the other Departments and Agencies are 
looking at the progress of NMCI.  In discussing information technology for the 
proposed department of Homeland Security, Richard Clark, special adviser to 
President Bush for cyberspace security said, "The model that we're looking at is 
the model of the Navy-Marine Corps [Intranet]" (Merle, Oct 2002).  The U.S. 
Congress wants Service Contracting to expand; they just want to ensure that they 
are included in the process.  As the number and value of these acquisitions rises, 
DoD will need to further refine their nature and requirements.        
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This research examined the oversight and general processes associated 
with the acquisition of services by the Department of Defense (DoD).  The 
research used the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) as a case study to reveal 
issues and potential problems associated with this acquisition type.  
The purpose of this chapter is to present conclusions and 
recommendations based on the research effort.  The answers to the primary and 
subsidiary research questions will be summarized along with suggestions for 
further research.    
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The NMCI contract revealed a significant gap in the policy and procedures 
governing Defense acquisitions.  This research identified the lack of distinction 
between service acquisitions and service contracts.  NMCI highlights this issue 
because it is both.  It is an individual service contract, and it is a comprehensive 
service acquisition.  DoN emphasized the contract aspects, Congress saw only its 
acquisition side.  There is nothing, in terms of policy, to compel a merger of the 
two constructs.          
As shown in this research, service acquisitions are not new and oversight 
of them by competent entities has existed from an early date.  Prior to NMCI, 
service acquisitions were almost exclusively viewed collectively.  NMCI is one of 
the few service acquisitions to be large enough to warrant individual attention.  
Based on current policy and regulations, the NMCI contract was correct.   
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NMCI is not the best example of a multiyear contract, but given the scope 
of its requirements and the lack of a suitable alternative it is acceptable.  Congress 
was correct to examine NMCI in detail and insist upon more definition in the 
justification for the requirement, solution, execution, and funding.  Imposing a 
single point of contact, i.e. a program manager, made sense when compared to the 
multi-headed organization arrangement originally proposed.  All of these changes, 
while delaying the execution of NMCI, have arguably made it a better program.  
The real outcome of NMCI, in turns of results for total cost, schedule and 
performance, will have to await the future.  Only then will the effectiveness of the 
oversight measures put in place really be measurable.  Starting a major IT 
acquisition program without a formal business case analysis and without a formal 
technical exit strategy beyond how the contract itself would be closed is highly 
risky.   
The management level of service acquisitions is more than just a reflection 
of their total dollar value.  It is a deliberate assessment of the criticality of these 
acquisitions to their owning entity, the risk and impact of failure, and interest 
shown by oversight agencies.  Although these could correlate with dollar value, 
they do not automatically do so. 
The testing and evaluation of services must avoid the mentality of "it's 
commercial so it must be acceptable."  Testing and evaluation must focus on the 
right aspects of the service.  The danger is that the evaluation will focus 
exclusively on the product or products being used in the service and fail to 
evaluate the overall service being provided.              
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Create New Major Acquisition Categories 
As a means of bringing parity to service acquisition, add Major Defense 
Service Acquisition (MDSA) and Major Information Technology Service 
Acquisition  (MITSA) as additional categories of Defense acquisitions.  Doing 
this would recognize the critical nature of service acquisition as a core function 
and would be an important step in distinguishing between service acquisitions and 
service contracts.  The unique nature of IT acquisition warrants a separate 
category just as it is separate in product acquisition. 
A model for the management structure for these new categories already 




2. Define Strategic Approach 
Define strategic approach within the upcoming DoD Defense acquisition 
guidance, thereby removing the ambiguity which currently exists with this term.     
3. Develop Testing Parameters 
The Office of Secretary of Defense, Operational Test & Evaluation 
(OSD(OT&E)) should be enlisted to examine and develop suitable testing criteria 
for the evaluation of services.  These tests must examine the acquisition 
performance in the indented application environment and not just focus on 
individual products.  
4. Apply the Guidance Already Developed 
Detailed policy and guidance has already been developed and promulgated 
concerning Performance Based Service Contracting, Modular Contracting and 
multi-year contracting.  The interim Defense acquisition guidance also 
specifically addresses the acquisition of services.  All of this is available 
immediately.  Their application would greatly serve to address the issues found in 
this research. 
5. Apply Other Best Practices 
GAO and other prominent consulting firms have studied the best practices 
of other Federal agencies and the commercial sector.  Recognizing that 
commercial practices do not always translate directly to Federal activities, apply 
those practices and lessons learned which are translatable.     
6. Training 
The crafting of policy is never a substitute for adequate training of the 
people required to execute it.  Include acquisition and other Defense leaders 
instruction in service acquisition at key DoD education centers such as the 
Defense Acquisition University, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and 
the Naval Postgraduate School.  Provide the many working level acquisition 
professionals education regarding service acquisition via distance learning, on site 
instruction, and forwarded materials.   
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D. REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question  
The primary research question that this thesis attempted to answer was: 
Are the current and proposed policies and procedures associated 
with the supervision of acquisition of services, such as the Navy-
Marine Corps Intranet, effective and consistent with best practices? 
Based on this research, the current policies and procedures associated with 
the supervision of acquisition of services are not effective, nor are they consistent 
with best practices.  Proposed policies and recently adopted legislation address the 
inefficiencies and incorporate many of the best practices.  As indicated in the 
Recommendations section, more best practices could be adopted.       
2. Subsidiary Questions 
a. How does the DoD currently manage the acquisition of 
large-scale systems and services? 
DoD manages the acquisition of systems via a formal milestone, testing, 
and decision-making process described within the DoD 5000 series of regulations.  
Milestone decisions on Major Defense Acquisition Programs are made by the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), or by the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications & 
Intelligence). 
DoD manages the acquisition of services, large-scale or otherwise, via its 
regular contracting mechanisms.  The Federal Acquisition Regulation, particularly 
Part 37, governs these mechanisms.  The flow of authority for contracting goes 
from the head of the individual agency, to the senior procurement executive 
within that agency, to the head of the contracting activity, down to the procuring 
contracting officer (PCO).  There are no formal milestones, testing or decision 
making required once the contract is initiated.  The contract itself just needs to be 
administered and ultimately closed.   
b. What policies and procedures are being proposed for 
DoD’s management of large-scale services? 
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The DoN is proposing a management structure for large-scale service 
acquisitions, which in some ways will mirror what is in place for product 
acquisitions.  The proposed policy will categorize service contracts by their dollar 
values as is currently done for weapon and product acquisitions.  However, the 
policy will retain acquisition authority within the traditional contracting channels.  
While no formal testing or milestones are being proposed, the policy will 
establish review procedures.  
The U.S. Congress is also proposing a new management structure, which 
will mirror what exists for other comparable acquisitions.  If NMCI is any guide, 
the U.S. Congress’ approach will also include a degree of formal testing along the 
lines of traditional weapon acquisitions. 
The interim guidance for Defense acquisitions insists that service 
acquisitions utilize a strategic approach to include: 
• Development of a picture of what the DoD is spending on services 
• An enterprise-wide approach to procuring services 
• Development of new ways of doing business. 
This guidance also insists that each acquisition of services have: 
• A documented acquisition strategy, updated when changes occur 
• Metrics for cost, schedule and performance 
• An approved data system for the collection and reporting of 
required data 
c. What are the best practices, both commercial and federal, 
for the acquisition of large-scale services? 
Among the keys within commercial industry for successfully managing 
large-scale services are: 
 
• Securing up front commitment from top leader 
• Obtaining improved knowledge on service spending 
• Creating supporting structure, processes, and roles 
• Enabling success through sustained leadership, communication, 
and metrics 
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• A strong program office staffed by people with management and 
technical expertise 
• Strong contract management and a good partnership among all 
program management office elements 
• Good relations and mutual expectations among oversight 
organizations  
E. AREAS REQUIRING FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. The Execution of Service Acquisition within the Environment 
of Evolutionary Acquisition and Spiral Development 
Evolutionary Acquisition:   
An acquisition strategy that defines, develops, produces or acquires 
and fields an initial hardware or software increment of operational 
capability... followed by subsequent increments of capability over 
time that accommodate improved technology and allowing for full 
and adaptable systems over time.  (Aldridge, 12 Apr 2002) 
Spiral Development: 
An iterative process for developing a defined set of capabilities 
within one increment.  This process provides the opportunity for 
interaction between the user, tester, and developer.  In this process 
the requirements are refined through experimentation and risk 
management, there is continuous feedback and the user is provided 
the best possible capability within the increment.  Each increment 
may include a number of spirals.  Spiral development implements 
evolutionary acquisition.   (Aldridge, 12 Apr 2002) 
How does service acquisition support these new acquisition initiatives?  
Where are the conflicts between service acquisition and evolutionary acquisition? 
2. Testing and Evaluation of Service Contracts 
What testing should be conducted by OSD(OT&E) and what should be 
conducted by the buying agency for a Major Defense Service Acquisition?  How 
should the rests of such testing be evaluated? 
E. THESIS SUMMARY 
Large-scale service acquisitions are becoming an increasing part of the 
Defense Acquisition System, and of how DoD secures and sustains the 
technologies, programs, and product support necessary to achieve the National 
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Security Strategy and support the United States Armed Forces.  Both DoD and the 
U.S. Congress recognize that current regulations and policies do not adequately 
address this shift.  Both institutions are making significant changes to bring the 
Defense Acquisition System in line with the best current practices and to set the 
stage for acquisitions in the near future. 
Even in the age of the war on terrorism, the Defense dollar will 
increasingly be asked to do more without help.  An aging and increasingly 
retirement eligible acquisition workforce will only compound the issue.  
Outsourcing of functions previously done in-house will become the norm if not an 
urgent necessity.  This means that all inherently governmental functions will have 
to be reexamined.  New initiatives such as evolutionary acquisition and spiral 
development will further change the way DoD acquires the goods and services it 
requires, and could redefine the environment in which service acquisitions are 
conducted.  Since NMCI will not be the last or the largest service contract to be 
awarded by DoD, the opportunity exists now to get in front of this train, to craft 
the policy and procedures needed, and to redefine the relationships which 
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APPENDIX C. INTERIM GUIDANCE  
Operation of the Defense Acquisition System 
TAB H 
 
ACQUISITION OF SERVICES 
Section 801 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2002, Pub. L. 107-107, required establishment of a management structure for the 
procurement of services by the Department of Defense.  This management 
structure requires that the acquisition of services shall be based on clear, 
performance-based requirements, and require identified and measurable outcomes 
properly planned and administered to achieve the intended results.  The following 
guidance shall apply: 
H1. Outcomes 
H1.1. All service acquisitions shall utilize a strategic approach to include: 
H1.1.1. Development of a picture of what the DoD is spending on 
services; 
H1.1.2. An enterprise-wide approach to procuring services; and 
H1.1.3. Development of new ways of doing business. 
H1.2. All service acquisitions shall be acquired by business arrangements 
that are in the best interests of the DoD and are entered into or issued and 
managed in compliance with applicable statutes, regulations, directives, and other 
requirements, regardless of whether the services are acquired by the DoD or by an 
official of the United States outside the DoD.  PMs shall coordinate with the DoD 
Component manpower authority in advance of contracting for operational support 
services to ensure that tasks and duties that are designated as inherently 
governmental or exempt are not contracted. 
H2. Decision Authorities shall establish mandatory procedures for assigned 
service acquisitions. 
H3. Each DoD Component shall establish a management review process that 
provides for consistent review and approval of service acquisitions. 
H4. Each acquisition of services shall have: 
H4.1. A documented acquisition strategy, updated when changes occur; 
H4.2. Metrics for cost, schedule and performance; 
H4.3. An approved data system for the collection and reporting of required 
data. 
H5. The Decision Authority shall conduct execution reviews to assess progress 
against the metrics. 
H6. Management of the acquisition of services is the responsibility of the 
USD(AT&L), ASD(C3I) for information technology, the CAE, the Head of 
Contracting Activity (HCA) (for those Components without a CAE), or such 
65 
designated officials in each Service/Agency as identified by the CAE or HCA (for 
those Components without a CAE).  Each of these designated officials can be a 
Decision Authority, and have the authority to exercise approval over the service 
acquisition, provided the designated official is independent of the official 
developing and executing the service acquisition strategy. 
H7. The acquisition of services may require the execution of multiple contracts or 
other instruments for committing or obligating funds (e.g. funds transfers; placing 
orders under existing contracts), therefore, the management level shall be 
determined using the total planned dollar value (including options, contingencies, 
funds transfers, provisioning, etc) of the acquisition. 
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